Reduction  of  Armaments 

and  a 

Treaty  of  Guarantee 


with  Regional  Agreements 


LORD  ROBERT  CECIL'S 

Proposals  and  Speech  in  the 
Third  Assembly  of  the 
League  of  Nations 


By 
CHARLES  H.  LEVERMORE 

Secretary    of   the   League    of  Nations    Union 
and  of  the  New  York  Peace  Society 


,-p 


Published  by  the 

NEW  YORK  PEACE  SOCIETY 

70  Fifth  Avenue 

1922 


I. — The  Temporary   Mixed  Commis$i6n   bri   Reduction 

of  Armament 

The  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  voted  on  February  25,  1921, 
to  create  a  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  on  Reduction  of  Armaments. 
The  name  was  chosen  to  distinguish  it  from  the  Permanent  Advisory 
Armaments  Commission  which  functions  under  Articles  I,  VIII,  and 
IX  of  the  Covenant.  The  latter  Commission  represents  the  land,  water 
and  air  services  of  Governments.  The  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  is 
constituted  to  represent  society  at  large,  comprising  representative  states- 
men and  diplomatists,  laborers  and  employers  of  labor,  economists  and 
financiers,  and  military  men  of  the  land,  sea  and  air  services,  twenty-nine 
in  all. 

The  Commission  first  met  at  Paris,  July  16-19,  1921.  The  Second 
Assembly  received  its  report,  and  charted  its  future  work  in  resolutions 
adopted  on  October  1,  1921.*  In  order  to  know  the  outcome  of  the 
Washington  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armaments,  the  Commission 
delayed  its  third  session  until  February  20,  1922.  A  British  delegate, 
Rear- Admiral  Segrave,  proposed  that  the  principle  of  reduction  in  naval 
armament,  adopted  at  Washington,  be  extended  to  States  that  are  mem- 
bers of  the  League.  Another  British  delegate,  Lord  Esher,  presented  an 
elaborate  draft  plan  for  the  reduction  of  land  armaments. 

The  Commission  voted  that,  with  the  approval  of  the  Council,  each 
Government  should  be  asked  to  furnish  a  statement  concerning  the  re- 
quirements of  its  national  security,  its  international  obligations,  needs 
arising  from  its  geographical  situation  and  any  special  circumstances. 
Each  Government  should  also  be  asked  to  tell  what  police  and  military 
forces  it  required  for  the  preservation  of  domestic  order,  and  what  was 
the  expense  of  that. 

The  Commission,  in  conjunction  with  the  Council,  also  authorized 
the  preparation  of  complete  statistical  reports  upon  the  armaments  of 
various  countries,  and  began  with  Italy  and  Belgium. 

Upon  the  question  about  the  private  manufacture  of  arms  and  traffic 
therein  the  Commission  voted  that  control  of  such  production  and  traffic 
could  best  be  secured  by  ratification  of  the  Arms  Traffic  Convention  of 
St.  Germain,  signed  at  Paris  September  10,  1919.  On  October  1,  1922, 
eleven  States,  signatory  to  that  Convention,  had  ratified  it,  but  most  of 
them  made  their  ratifications  conditional  upon  similar  action  by  all  the 
Great  Powers.  It  was  felt  that  the  Convention  was  futile  unless  the 
United  States  ratified  it.  At  that  time  the  United  States  Government  had 
not  replied  to  any  of  the  letters  from  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  about 
this  subject. 


See  full  report  in  Levermore's  Second  Year  Book  of  the  League  of  Nations,  pp.  175-180. 

784943 


'  ill  :th"ev  winter  and  spring  of  1922,  in  deference  to  the 
vote  of  the  Second  Assembly,  repeating  the  action  of  the  First  Assembly, 
the  Governments  were  receiving  letters  from  the  Secretariat,  approved 
by  the  Council,  and  asking  that  member- States  should  agree  to  keep 
appropriations  for  military,  naval  and  air  forces  during  the  next  two 
years  within  the  limits  of  the  expenditures  for  the  current  year. 

The  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  held  another  session  (its  fourth 
in  total  number)  at  Paris,  July  3-7.  The  replies  to  the  above-mentioned 
inquiry  had  not  been  very  numerous  or  encouraging.  The  Segrave  pro- 
posal was  referred  to  the  naval  section  of  the  Permanent  Armaments 
Commission.  The  Esher  plan  was  overshadowed  in  the  discussion  by 
proposals  brought  forward  by  Lord  Robert  Cecil  for  a  treaty  of  mutual 
guarantee  against  aggression,  coupled  with  military,  naval,  and  aerial 
disarmament. 

The  proposed  treaty,  which  amounted  to  an  amendment  of  the 
Covenant  especially  with  respect  to  Articles  X  and  XVI,  stipulated  that 
the  guarantee  should  be  enforced  in  Europe  by  European  forces  only; 
in  Asia  by  Asiatic  States ;  in  America  by  American  States ;  and  in  Africa 
by  African  States.  The  guarantee  will  not  be  invoked  for  any  State 
which  has  not  reduced  its  land,  sea,  and  air  forces  in  accordance  with 
the  treaty.  The  Commission  approved  Lord  Robert's  proposals  as  the 
basis  of  a  plan  for  disarmament,  and  embodied  it  in  the  Commission's 
report  to  the  Third  Assembly. 

It  is  noteworthy  that,  during  this  July  session  of  the  Commission, 
the  Chilean  delegate  announced  that,  relying  on  the  information  gathered 
by  the  Commission  and  on  the  results  of  the  Washington  Conference,  his 
country  would  ask  for  the  inclusion  of  the  whole  question  of  world  dis- 
armament in  the  agenda  of  the  Fifth  Pan-American  Congress  at  Santiago 
in  March,  1923. 

Before  the  Third  Assembly  met,  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  re- 
ceived a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington,  dated  July 
28,  1922,  and  answering  the  letter  of  the  Secretary-General  of  November 
21,  1921,  about  the  Convention  of  St.  Germain. 

The  Secretary  said :  "While  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
is  in  cordial  sympathy  with  efforts  to  restrict  traffic  in  arms  and  muni- 
tions of  war,  it  finds  itself  unable  to  approve  the  provisions  of  the  Con- 
vention and  to  give  any  assurance  of  its  ratification." 

The  Secretary  offers  no  reason  for  the  inability,  but  an  examination 
of  the  text  of  the  Convention*  shows  a  reason  in  the  relation  of  the  life 
and  operation  of  the  agreement  to  the  Council  and  Secretariat  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 


*  The  text  of  the  Convention  can  be  conveniently  consulted  in  Pamphlet  No.  164  of  the 
publications  of  the  American  Association  for  International   Conciliation    (July,   1921). 


II. — Reduction   of  Armaments  as  Considered  in  Com- 
mittee of  the  Third  Assembly  of  the  League 
of  Nations 

When  the  Third  Assembly  met,  the  subject  of  Reduction  of  Arma- 
ments was  assigned  to  Committee  No.  3.  That  Committee,  under  the 
chairmanship  of  a  Cuban  delegate,  began  its  work  on  Friday,  September 
8,  with  the  report  of  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission,  including  Lord 
Robert  Cecil's  proposals. 

Lord  Robert  presented  the  report.  He  said  that  the  Commission  had 
set  aside  Lord  Esher's  scheme.  It  was  clear  that  forces  must  be  limited 
in  material  as  well  as  in  personnel.  A  numerical  standard  for  personnel 
would  be  necessary,  and  a  budgetary  standard  for  material.  He  thought 
that  colonial  forces  must  be  considered  apart  from  the  others.  The 
answers  by  Governments  to  the  inquiry  into  armaments  showed  that  Gov- 
ernments had  no  confidence  in  their  immunity  from  sudden  attack.  If 
fear  of  aggression  were  removed,  reduction  of  armaments  would  follow 
naturally.  At  present  the  considerable  reductions  were  chiefly  produced 
by  economic  pressure. 

He  explained  his  plan  for  a  treaty  of  mutual  guarantee,  and  read 
these  resolutions  (substantially  identical  with  those  presented  to  the 
Temporary  Mixed  Commission)  as  the  basis  of  such  a  treaty: 

1.  No  scheme  for  the  reduction  of  armaments  can  ever  be  really 
successful  unless  it  is  general. 

2.  In  the  present  state  of  the  world,  the  majority  of  Governments 
would  be  unable  to  accept  the  responsibility  for  a  serious  reduction  of 
armaments  unless  they  received  in  exchange  a  satisfactory  guarantee 
of  the  safety  of  their  countries. 

3.  Such  a  guarantee  can  be  found  in  a  general  defensive  agree- 
ment between  all  the  countries  concerned,  binding  them  to  provide  im- 
mediate and  effective   assistance  in  accordance  with   a  pre-arranged 
plan  in  the  event  of  one  of  them  being  attacked,  provided  that  the  obli- 
gation to  render  assistance  to  a  country  attacked  shall  be  limited  in 
principle  to  those  countries  situated  in  the  same  part  of  the  globe.     In 
cases,  however,  where,  for  historical,  geographical,  or  other  reasons,  a 
country  is  in  special  danger  of  attack,  detailed  arrangements  should  be 
made  for  its  defence  in  accordance  with  the  above-mentioned  plan. 

4.  It  is  understood  that  the  whole  of  the  above  resolutions  are  con- 
ditional on  a  reduction  of  armaments  being  carried  out  on  lines  laic* 
down   beforehand,   and   on   the  provision   of   effective   machinery   to 
ensure  the  realization  and  the  maintenance  of  such  a  reduction. 

The  Third  Committee  of  the  Assembly  held  its  ninth  and  final  meet- 
ing on  September  23.  During  these  nine  sessions  (Sept.  8-23)  the  Com- 
mittee condensed  from  its  discussion  and  from  the  reports  presented  to 
it  the  sixteen  resolutions  which  follow.  These  resolutions  with  an  ac- 


companying  report,  were  first  laid  before  the  seventeenth  plenary  session 
of  the  Assembly,  September  26,  by  Lord  Robert  Cecil.  They  were  dis- 
cussed through  the  morning  and  afternoon  sessions  of  that  day,  and  were 
adopted  by  the  Assembly  in  its  nineteenth  plenary  session,  the  next  morn- 
ing, September  27. 

The  text  of  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Assembly  was  as  follows : 
I  (a).  The  Assembly  considers  it  is  desirable  that  the  Tempo- 
rary Mixed  Commission  should  be  asked  to  continue  for  another  year 
the  work  which  it  has  begun  and  that  its  report  be  submitted  at  an 
early  date  previous  to  that  of  the  next  Assembly.  The  Assembly 
further  requests  the  Council  to  invite  the  Members  of  the  League  to 
lend  their  assistance  and  advice  with  regard  to  proposals  for  reduction 
of  land  armaments  and  a  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee. 

(b.)  The  Assembly  desires  to  express  its  sense  of  the  great  value 
of  the  collaboration  that  has  existed  between  the  Temporary  Mixed 
Commission  and  the  Permanent  Advisory  Commission,  and  trusts  that 
it  will  continue  and,  if  possible,  increase.  The  Assembly  is  of  opinion 
that  the  great  technical  competence  of  the  Permanent  Advisory  Com- 
mission cannot  but  be  of  essential  service  in  the  study,  from  the  tech- 
nical military  point  of  view,  of  the  questions  with  which  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Commission  deals. 

Approved  in  Committee,  September  23. 

II.  The  Assembly  recommends  that,  as  a  preliminary  step,  the 
European  States  existing  before  the  war  in  1914,  under  their  present 
description,  whose  juridical  status  has  not  been  altered  by  the  war,  and 
which  are  not,  at  the  moment,  engaged  in  military  operations  which 
justify  their  armaments,  be  invited  to  reduce  the  total  of  their  military, 
naval  and  air  expenditure  to  the  figures  for  1913,  calculated  on  the 
basis  of  pre-war  prices  according  to  the  method  employed  by  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Commission. 

Proposed  by  M.  de  Jouvenel  (France).  Approved  by  the  Committee, 
September  14.  The  information  gathered  by  the  Temporary  Mixed 
Commission  shows  that  estimated  defense  expenditures  of  Governments 
for  1922-23  is  less  than  that  for  the  two  previous  years.  It  must  be 
noted,  however,  that  demobilization  and  decrease  in  cost  of  raw  mate- 
ials  have  caused  some  decrease  in  war  charges. 

III.  The  Assembly  expresses  its  satisfaction  at  the  remarkable 
work  accomplished  in  collecting  and  drawing  up  statistical  data  in  an 
entirely  new  and  peculiarly  difficult  field. 

Taking  into  account  the  work  accomplished,  and  reserving  the 
question  of  the  scope  it  might  be  necessary  to  give  to  a  statistical  enquiry 
at  a  later  date,  the  Assembly  desires  to  determine  for  the  coming  year 
the  programme  which  appears  to  it  at  the  same  time  both  immediately 
useful  and  practicable.  It  therefore  proposes  that  this  programme 
should  be  limited  to  the  two  following  points : 


(1)  Peace-time  armaments; 

(2)  Expenditure  on  armaments. 

The  Assembly  considers  it  desirable  that  the  Council  should  re- 
quest the  Permanent  Advisory  Commission  to  collaborate  with  the 
Temporary  Mixed  Commission  in  that  part  of  the  work  which  deals 
with  technical  military,  naval  and  air  questions. 

The  work  of  a  sub-committee,  headed  by  Count  Tosti  de  Valminuta 
(Italy),  and  approved  in  Committee,  September  21. 

IV.  The  Assembly,  having  considered  the  report  of  the  Tempo- 
rary Mixed  Commission,  is  of  opinion  that  the  only  step  which  could 
usefully  be  taken  in  connection  with  surplus  stocks  of  arms  and  ammu- 
nition is  the  control  of  the  international  traffic  in  arms. 

Moved  by   Lord  Robert   Cecil  and   approved  in    Committee,   Septem- 
ber 19. 

V.  The  Assembly,  having  noted  the  proposal  of  the  Temporary 
Mixed  Commission  for  an  international  agreement  for  the  control  of 
the  manufacture  of  arms  by  private  companies,  urges  on  the  Council 
to  consider  the  advisability  of  summoning  at  an  appropriate  moment,  a 
conference  of  the  Members  of  the  League  to  embody  this  agreement 
in  the  form  of  a  convention.    The  Assembly  is  further  of  the  opinion 
that  States  not  Members  of  the  League  should  be  invited  to  participate 
in  this  conference  and  to  co-operate  in  the  policy  on  which  it  may  agree. 

Lord  Robert  Cecil's  report.     Approved  in   Committee,   September   16. 

VI.  The  Assembly : 

(a)  Considers  it  highly  desirable  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  should  express  the  objections  which  it  has  to  formulate  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Convention  of  St.  Germain,  as  well  as  any  proposals 
which  it  may  care  to  make  as  to  the  way  in  which  these  objections  can 
be  overcome ; 

(b)  Is  of  the  opinion  that  the  Temporary   Mixed  Commission 
should  be  instructed  to  prepare  a  scheme  for  the  control  of  the  interna- 
tional traffic  in  arms,  to  be  considered  by  the  Conference  which  is  to 
deal  with  the  private  manufacture  of  arms ; 

(c)  Requests  the  Council  to  take  such  steps  as  it  thinks  advisable 
to  carry  out  the  purpose  above  indicated. 

Lord  Robert  Cecil's  report.     Approved,  September  16. 

VTI  (a)  The  Assembly,  having  considered  the  report  of  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Commission  on  the  subject  of  the  development  of  chem- 
ical warfare,  approves  its  action  in  establishing  a  special  Sub-Commit- 
tee to  report  on  the  probable  effects  of  chemical  discoveries  in  future 
wars,  and  requests  the  Council  and  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission 
to  take  every  possible  measure  to  secure  the  fullest  publicity  for  the 
report  of  this  Sub-Committee. 

(b)  The  Assembly  requests  the  Council  to  recommend  the  Mem- 
bers of  the  League  and  other  nations  to  adhere  to  the  Treaty  of  Wash- 


ington  (February*  6th,  1922)  concerning  the  use  of  asphyxiating  gas 
and  submarines  in  war,  and  other  similar  matters. 

Section  b  of  No.  VII  was  originally  proposed  by  Sir  Mark  Sheldon 
(Australia)  and,  with  slight  amendment  offered  by  Mr.  Urrutia  (Colom- 
bia), was  approved  in  Committee,  September  23.  M.  Urrutia  had  orig- 
inally proposed  a  new  treaty  between  League  members,  extending  to 
themselves  the  agreements  of  the  Washington  Conference  on  gas,  sub- 
marines and  capture  of  merchant  vessels,  but  he  withdrew  his  proposal 
in  favor  of  Sir  Mark  Sheldon's. 

VIII.  The  Assembly,  having  considered  the  answers  from  the 
Governments  of  twenty-six  Members  of  the  League  to  the  enquiry 
issued  to  them  by  the  Council  as  to  the  requirements  of  their  national 
security,  desires  to  state  that  it  attaches  the  utmost  importance  to  these 
replies  as  affording  a  basis  for  the  further  deliberations  of  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Commission,  and  recommends  to  the  Council  that  it 
should  once  again  urge  the  Members  of  the  League  which  have  not  yet 
sent  in  their  replies  to  do  so  without  delay. 
Approved  in  Committee,  September  14. 

.IX.  The  Assembly  approves  the  recommendation  of  the  Tempo- 
rary Mixed  Commission  that  the  Council  should  consider  whether  the 
time  has  not  come  to  discuss  the  application  of  the  paragraph  of  Article  8 
of  the  Covenant  relating  to  the  exchange  of  military  information  be- 
tween States  Members  of  the  League. 

Approved  in   Committee,   September   14. 

X.  The  Assembly  expresses  its  satisfaction  at  the  work  accom- 
plished at  Washington  in  connection  with  the  reduction  of  naval  arma- 
ments. 

Approved  in   Committee,   September  21. 

XI  (a)  The  Assembly  welcomes  with  interest  the  Chilean  Gov- 
ernment's initiative  in  submitting  the  question  of  disarmament  to  the 
Pan-American  Conference  which  is  to  meet  at  Santiago  in  March,  1923. 
The  Assembly  expresses  the  hope  that  the  Conference  may  arrive 
at  practical  solutions  capable  of  being  fitted  into  the  more  general 
scheme  of  disarmament  which  is  being  considered  by  the  League  of 
Nations. 

Approved  in   Committee,   September  21. 

(b)  The  Assembly  recommends  to  the  Council  that  the  expert 
services  of  the  League  of  Nations  should  eventually  be  authorized  to 
co-operate  in  the  work  of  the  Pan-American  Conference  of  Santiago. 
Section  b  was  added  to  this  resolution  on  motion  of  M.  de  Palacios 
(Spain),  by  vote  of  the  Assembly  itself,  on  September  27. 
XII.     The  Assembly  recommends: 

(a)  That  an  International  Conference  should  be  summoned  by 
the  Council  as  soon  as  possible,  to  which  all  States,  whether  Members 
of  the  League  or  not,  should  be  invited,  with  a  view  to  considering 
the  extension  to  all  non-signatory  States  of  the  principles  of  the  Wash- 

8 


ington  Treaty  for  the  limitation  of  naval  armaments,  it  being  under- 
stood that  any  special  cases,  including  those  of  the  new  States,  shall  be 
given  due  consideration  at  the  Conference  ; 

(b)  That  the  report  of  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission,  to- 
gether with  the  report  and  the  draft  Convention  prepared  by  the  Perma- 
nent Advisory  Commission,  as  well  as  the  text  of  the  Washington 
Treaty,  should  be  forwarded  immediately  to  various  Governments  for 
consideration. 

This  was  originally  Lord  Robert  Cecil's  resolution  definitely  recom- 
mending that  the  principles  of  the  Washington  Naval  Treaty  should  be 
extended  to  all  States.  Brazil  and  Poland  objected  to  that,  and  the 
present  form  of  the  first  paragraph  is  due  to  Mr.  H.  A.  L.  Fisher  (Great 
Britain).  Approved  in  Committee,  September  16.  Brazil  abstained 
from  voting,  and  her  delegate,  M.  de  Oliveira,  said  that  his  Government 
did  not  approve  of  the  Washington  agreement.  On  the  27th,  when  the 
Assembly  adopted  the  whole  report,  M.  de  Oliveira  said  that  his  Gov- 
ernment was  now  ready  to  accept  in  principle  the  proposed  Conference, 
with  the  understanding  that  its  conclusions  would  not  depart  from  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Covenant. 

XIII.  The  Assembly,  having  examined  the  report  of  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Commission  on  the  general  principles  of  land  and  air 
disarmament,  instructs  the  Commission  to  continue  its  investigations 
on  the  basis  of  these  principles,  with  a  view  to  preparing  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  next  Assembly  a  definite  scheme  for  the  general  reduc- 
tion of  land  and  air  armaments. 

Lord  Robert  Cecil's  resolution,  the  first  one  approved  in  Committee, 
September  14. 

XIV.  (a).  The  Assembly,  having  considered  the  report  of  the 
Temporary  Mixed  Commission  on  the  question  of  a  general  Treaty  of 
Mutual  Guarantee,  being  of  opinion  that  this  report  can  in  no  way  affect 
the  complete  validity  of  all  the  Treaties  of  Peace  or  other  agreements 
which  are  known  to  exist  between  States ;  and,  considering  that,  this 
report  contains  valuable  suggestions  as  to  the  methods  by  which  a 
Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee  could  be  made  effective,  is  of  the  opinion 
that  : 

1.  No  scheme  for  the  reduction  of  armaments,  within  the  mean- 
ing of  Article  8  of  the  Covenant,  can  be  fully  successful  unless  it  is 
general. 

2.  In  the  present  state  of  the  world  many  Governments  would 
be  unable  to  accept  the  responsibility  for  a  serious  reduction  of  arma- 
ments unless  they  received  in  exchange  a  satisfactory  guarantee  of 
the  safety  of  their  country. 

3.  Such  a  guarantee  can  be  found  in  a  defensive  agreement 
which  should  be  open  to  all  countries,  binding  them  to  provide  imme- 
diate and  effective  assistance  in  accordance  with  a  pre-arranged  plan 
in  the  event  of  one  of  them  being  attacked,  provided  that  the  obliga- 


tion  to  render  assistance  to  a  country  attacked  shall  be  limited  in 
principle  to  those  countries  situated  in  the  same  part  of  the  globe. 
In  cases,  however,  where,  for  historical,  geographical,  or  other  rea- 
sons, a  country  is  in  special  danger  of  attack,  detailed  arrange- 
ments should  be  made  for  its  defence  in  accordance  with  the  above- 
mentioned  plan. 

4.  As  a  general  reduction  of  armaments  is  the  object  of  the 
three  preceding  statements,  and  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee  the 
means  of  achieving  that  object,  previous  consent  to  this  reduction  is 
therefore  the  first  condition  for  the  Treaty. 

This  reduction  could  be  carried  out  either  by  means  of  a  gen- 
eral Treaty,  which  is  the  most  desirable  plan,  or  by  means  of  par- 
tial treaties  designed  to  be  extended  and  open  to  all  countries. 

In  the  former  case,  the  Treaty  will  carry  with  it  a  general  reduc- 
tion of  armaments.  In  the  latter  case,  the  reduction  should  be  pro- 
portionate to  the  guarantees  afforded  by  the  Treaty. 

The  Council  of  the  League,  after  having  taken  the  advice  of  the 
Temporary  Mixed  Commission,  which  will  examine  how  each  of 
these  two  systems  could  be  carried  out,  should  further  formulate  and 
submit  to  the  Governments,  for  their  consideration  and  sovereign 
decision,  the  plan  of  the  machinery,  both  political  and  military,  nec- 
essary to  bring  them  clearly  into  effect. 

(b)  The  Assembly  requests  the  Council  to  submit  to  the  various 
Governments  the  above  proposals  for  their  observation  and  requests 
the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  to  continue  its  investigations,  and, 
in  order  to  give  precision  to  the  above  statements,  to  prepare  a  draft 
Treaty  embodying  the  principles  contained  therein. 

The  discussion  over  this  resolution  was  prolonged.  Lord  Robert  Cecil 
held  that  a  reduction  of  armaments  should  precede  a  treaty  of  guar- 
antee. M.  de  Jouvenel  was  sure  that  a  treaty  of  guarantee  must  precede 
any  reduction.  The  text,  as  it  stands,  represents  the  work  of  these  two 
men  and  of  Count  Tosti  de  Valminuta  (Italy),  and  Mr.  H.  A.  L.  Fisher. 
Approved  in  Committee,  September  19. 

The  Temporary  Mixed  Commission,  in  its  report,  pointed  out  that 
such  a  treaty  of  guarantee  must  show  how: 

First,  when  an  outbreak  of  war  has  occurred,  to  determine,  with  the 
briefest  possible  delay,  which  State  is  the  aggressor. 

Second,  to  devise  the  means  by  which  mutual  military  aid  can  be 
brought  without  delay,  which  might  be  fatal  to  the  State  attacked. 

The  Commission  proposed  that  the  Council  of  the  League  should 
decide,  if  necessary,  by  a  three-quarters  majority,  which  State  is  the 
aggressor,  and  should  be  obliged  to  do  so  within  four  days. 

As  a  test,  the  Commission  suggested  that  that  State  is  the  aggressor 
which  has  deliberately  violated  the  territory  of  another,  and  that  the 
Council  might  send  an  expert  Commission  to  the  spot  to  determine  the 
facts.  The  Third  Committee  of  the  Assembly  approved  these  sugges- 
tions. It  agreed  that  such  a  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee  would  be  in- 
effective unless  ratified  by  a  great  number  of  States,  including  "nearly 

10 


all,  if  not  all,  the  greater  military  powers."  A  plan  for  such  a  treaty 
except  on  these  conditions,  "might  result  in  a  re-creation  of  the  pre-war 
system  of  group  alliances."  The  Third  Committee  agreed  that  a  Treaty 
of  Guarantee  and  Reduction  of  Armaments  are  two  essential  parts  of 
one  policy,  and  that  the  Commission  should  be  asked  to  find  out  how 
the  two  measures  can  come  into  force  together. 

The  important  regional  feature  of  Lord  Robert's  original  draft-treaty 
is  alluded  to  only  in  paragraph  3  of  No.  XIV.  Regional  responsibility 
would  inevitably  mean  a  re-grouping  of  States  according  to  the  terri- 
torial boundaries  within  which  they  had  given  guarantees  of  mutual 
security.  The  probable  result  would  be,  roughly  speaking,  a  group  or 
League  for  each  continent  of  the  Old  World,  and  the  recognition  of  the 
Pan-American  Union  as  the  guaranteeing  group  for  both  the  Americas, 
if  that  body  would  consent  to  classify  itself  with  the  similar  international 
organizations.  The  Pan-American  Union  is  undeniably  the  oldest  exist- 
ing League  of  Nations,  having  been  created  under  the  auspices  of  the 
United  States  as  far  back  as  1891.  Such  a  plan  of  continental  groups 
would  appear  to  eliminate  all  objections  to  the  League  principle  which 
.  were  derived  from  the  fear  that  the  United  States  might  be  morally 
obligated  to  interfere  in  the  quarrels  of  Europe,  Asia  and  Africa.  It 
would  materially  change  Article  X  of  the  Covenant  or  render  it  un- 
necessary. It  would  result  in  the  amendment  of  Article  XVI,  and  in 
the  considerable  expansion  of  Article  XXI  ("regional  understandings 
like  the  Monroe  Doctrine").  It  would  definitely  establish  a  principle  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  the  basis  of  each  regional  League. 

XV.  The  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations, 

Whilst  declaring  that  the  reduction  of  armaments  contemplated 
by  Article  8  of  the  Covenant  cannot  achieve  its  full  effect  for  world- 
peace  unless  it  be  general : 

Desires  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  regional  agreements  for 
the  purpose  of  reducing  armaments — agreements  which,  if  necessary, 
might  even  go  beyond  the  measures  decided  upon  in  respect  of  general 
reduction ; 

And  requests  the  Council  to  ask  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission 
to  take  into  consideration  during  its  subsequent  work,  the  possibility 
of  recommending  the  conclusion  of  similar  agreements  to  States  which 
might  be  concerned. 

This  resolution  was  proposed  in  Committee  by  Dr.  Christian  Lange 
(Norway),  immediately  after  the  approval  of  No.  XIV.  It  is  an  ex- 
tension of  the  idea  of  regional  agreements,  doubtless  with  the  Scandi- 
navian countries  in  view.  Approved  in  Committee,  September  19. 

XVI.  The  Assembly, 

Considering  that  moral  disarmament  is  an  essential  preliminary 
condition  of  material  disarmament,  and  that  this  moral  disarmament 
can  only  be  achieved  in  an  atmosphere  of  mutual  confidence  and 
security  ; 

Declares : 

That  such  confidence  cannot  be  attained  so  long  as  the  world  con- 
tinues to  suffer  from  disorganization  of  the  exchanges,  economic  chaos 

11 


and  unemployment,  and  that  the  only  method  of  remedying  these  evils 
is  to  put  an  end  to  the  uncertainty  which  prevails  regarding  the  means 
for  the  restoration  of  the  devastated  regions  and  the  settlement  of  the 
inter- Allied  debts; 

Expresses  the  hope  that,  in  so  far  as  these  questions  can  be  regu- 
lated by  the  unaided  efforts  of  the  European  nations,  the  Governments 
signatories  of  the  international  treaties  and  agreements  which  deal  with 
these  questions,  and  within  the  framework  of  which  they  must  be 
envisaged,  will  achieve  as  soon  as  possible  a  general  settlement  of  the 
problem  of  reparations  and  inter-Allied  debts. 
It  further  recommends : 

That  the  Council  shall  devote  constant  attention  to  every  effort 
made  in  this  direction  by  the  Governments  concerned,  it  being  under- 
stood that  it  can  only  usefully  assist  in  the  solution  of  these  problems 
if  requested  to  do  so  by  the  Governments  in  question. 

Resolution  No.  XVI  was  proposed  by  M.  de  Jouvenel.  Herein  for  the 
first  time  the  French  Government  permitted  itself  to  suggest  the  sub- 
mission of  the  reparations  problem  to  a  new  conference,  and  in  that 
connection  to  link  together  reparations,  allied  debts,  and  reduction  of 
armaments.  Approved  in  Committee,  September  21. 

Of  the  numerous  speeches  made  in  Committee  in  debate  over  No.  XVI, 
two  are  especially  significant,  that  of  M.  de  Jouvenel  in  offering  the  resolution, 
and  that  of  Mr.  Fisher  in  comment  upon  it.  They  are  summarized  in  the  daily 
Journal  of  the  Assembly  as  follows: 

M.  de  Jouvenel  was  happy  to  note  that  Lord  Robert  Cecil  had  asked  the 
Committee  to  contemplate  conditions  immediately  essential  to  peace.  It  was 
of  the  highest  importance  for  the  League  of  Nations  that,  after  having  found 
a  diplomatic  and  military  formula  for  disarmament,  that  is  to  say  for  peace, 
by  means  of  the  Treaty  of  Guarantee,  it  should  also  find  for  disarmament  a 
political  and  economic  formula.  It  was  necessary  to  define  the  terms  of  the 
problem  and  not  to  give  the  impression  that  the  League  of  Nations  was  en- 
croaching on  the  rights  of  States. 

France  was  the  victim  of  an  international  calumny.  After  her  victory  she 
demanded  justice.  For  France,  victory  had  implied  security  and  reparations, 
but,  from  the  point  of  view  of  security  and  reparations,  she  had  obtained 
nothing. 

If  France  was  to  discharge  her  duties  towards  the  Allies  under  the  condi- 
tions contemplated  for  the  payment  of  the  American  credits,  she  would  have 
to  pay  every  year  1,657  million  gold  marks,  whereas  she  was  receiving  only 
1,560.  Thus  the  invasion  would  be  charged  to  the  account  of  the  victims. 

The  Supreme  Council  and  the  Financial  Conference  of  Brussels  had  de- 
clared that  the  reconstruction  of  the  devastated  regions  was  the  first  necessity 
for  the  reconstruction  of  Europe.  France  had  already  expended  84  milliards 
on  this  work  of  reconstruction. 

France  believed  that  the  present  European  difficulties  could  not  be  com- 
pletely solved  without  the  intervention  of  the  United  States,  but  as  Europe  had 
awaited  the  intervention  of  the  United  States  during  the  war,  so  Europe  must 
necessarily  show  her  solidarity  after  the  war  without  waiting  for  that  inter- 
vention. The  war  had  destroyed  the  economic  system  of  Europe.  No  State 
was  in  a  position  to  balance  its  budget  or  to  make  an  inventory  of  its  assets. 

12 


It  was  essential  to  emerge  from  the  era  of  the  moratorium  and  to  find  prac- 
tical solutions  within  the  limits  of  the  treaties  and  international  agreements. 

The  treaties  of  peace  were  not  perfect,  but  respect  for  international  con- 
tracts was  the  first  foundation  of  peace.  In  order  to  solve  the  problems  which 
presented  themselves,  it  would  be  sufficient,  without  impeaching  the  treaties, 
to  make  the  necessary  calculations  and  to  realize  that  the  problems  of  repara- 
tions and  of  Inter-Allied  debts  were  inseparable,  and  that  the  nations  must 
choose  between  being  united  for  the  reconstruction  of  Europe  or  being  united 
in  a  common  disaster. 

Mr.  Fisher  said  that  he  accepted  M.  de  Jouvenel's  proposal  for  three 
reasons.  First,  there  was  a  close  connection  between  reparations  and  Inter- 
Allied  debts  and  the  question  of  disarmament.  Secondly,  there  was  the  urgent 
necessity  of  finding  a  prompt  solution  for  these  complicated  and  difficult  ques- 
tions. France's  right  to  obtain  reparation  for  her  devastated  areas  could  not 
be  disputed.  It  was  not  the  end  but  the  means  upon  which  agreement  had  not 
yet  been  reached.  The  interests  of  Europe  urgently  demanded  that  a  practical 
solution  should  be  found.  His  third  reason  for  supporting  M.  de  Jouvenel  was 
because  the  whole  problem  might  at  some  future  date  be  referred  to  the 
League  of  Nations.  It  would  only  be  at  the  request  of  the  Governments  con- 
cerned that  the  Council  would  offer  to  intervene,  and  that  request  would  not 
be  made  unless  the  Great  Powers  had  been  unable  to  reach  agreement. 

He  emphatically  agreed  with  M.  de  Jouvenel  that  the  support  of  the 
United  States  was  essential.  It  was  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  United 
States  had  withdrawn  from  European  politics  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

Germany's  present  attitude  seemed  to  make  a  settlement  more  difficult. 
He  hoped  that  her  business  instinct,  if  nothing  else,  would  cause  her  to  co- 
operate in  a  rational  solution  of  the  problem,  which  was  causing  misery  and 
distress  throughout  Europe.  An  appeal  should  be  made  tp  the  reasonable 
element  of  German  public  opinion.  The  Peace  Treaties  must  be  observed  and 
executed.  Should  the  problem  be  referred  either  wholly  ar  partially  to  the 
Council,  this  would  be  a  departure  from  the  strict  text  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, and  could  only  take  place  with  the  full  concurrence  of  all  the  Powers 
concerned. 


III. — Lord  Robert  Cecil's  Speech  in  the  Assembly 

September  26,  on  presenting  the  report  of  the  Third  Committee  with 
the  foregoing  sixteen  resolutions,  is  here  reproduced  verbatim,  only  an 
unimportant  introductory  paragraph  being  omitted: 

The  subject  of  disarmament  is  no  new  one  for  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. Fundamentally  it  goes  back  to  Article  8  of  the  Covenant  itself,  and 
all  the  work  that  we  have  done  this  year  and  the  work  that  we  did  last 
year  and  the  year  before  has  been  based  upon  the  principle  and  the 
procedure  indicated  in  that  Article.  I  need  not  read  it  to  you  because  it 
is  familiar  to  all  of  you.  But  one  point  I  want  to-  emphasize  is  that  while 
insisting  very  strongly  on  the  necessity  for  the  reduction  of  armaments, 
it  assigns  to  the  League  of  Nations  a  very  special  duty  in  that  respect. 
It  assigns  to  us  the  duty  of  formulating  schemes  for  the  reduction  of 
armaments  which  are  to  be  submitted  to  the  Governments  represented 
in  the  League  for  their  final  decision.  What  we  are  about,  therefore,  is 

13 


not  to  carry  out  reductions,  but  to  formulate  schemes  on  which  reduc- 
tions may  be  made,  if  the  Governments  are  willing  to  make  them. 

In  the  First  Assembly  the  subject  was  considered,  but  owing  to  the 
turmoil  that  still,  existed  in  the  world  it  was  not  possible  to  take  any  very 
striking  step.  The  most  that  was  done  was  to  emphasize,  by  reference 
to  many  international  pronouncements,  the  importance  of  disarmament, 
to  make  an  earnest  appeal  for  the  ratification  of  the  Arms  Traffic  Con- 
vention of  St.  Germain,  and  to  appoint  a  new  body — a  Temporary  Mixed 
Commission  as  it  was  called — mixed  because  it  was  to  consist  partly  of 
civilian  experts  and  partly  of  military  experts — to  consider  and  report  to 
the  following  Assembly  what  could  be  done. 

At  the  last  Assembly  we  did  make  some  little  progress.  We  directed 
that  statistics  should  be  collected  to  enable  a  scheme  of  reduction  after- 
wards to  be  formulated.  We  repeated,  with  great  emphasis,  our  resolu- 
tions about  the  importance  of  putting  a  stop  to,  or,  at  any  rate,  of  con- 
trolling the  traffic  in  arms,  and,  amongst  other  things,  we  directed  the 
Temporary  Mixed  Commission  to  bring  up  a  definite  scheme  of  disarma- 
ment for  the  consideration  of  this  Assembly. 

I  venture  to  submit  to  this  Assembly  that  a  considerable  advance  has 
been  made  this  year.  The  various  Commissions  have  been  engaged,  partly 
in  preparatory  work,  work  which  is  necessary  for  an  ultimate  scheme  of 
reduction  of  armaments,  and  partly  in  making  definite  proposals  which 
would  result  in  a  reduction  of  armaments  if  they  were  adopted  by  the 
Governments. 

On  the  preparatory  side  we  have  to  report  to  you  that  a  very  con- 
siderable quantity  of  statistics  has  been  prepared,  which  really  do  enable 
anyone  who  studies  them  to  form  a  good  bird's-eye  view  of  the  armaments 
problem.  Indeed,  I  think  the  only  criticism  that  can  be  made  upon  the 
work  of  those  who  have  been  engaged  in  collecting  the  statistics  is  that, 
if  anything,  they  have  been  too  elaborate  and  too  thorough  in  their 
work;  and  one  of  the  recommendations  we  put  before  you  this  year  is 
that  for  the  future  the  statistics  should  be  confined  strictly  to  the  direct 
points  which  are  of  interest,  namely,  the  actual  peace  strength  of  the 
existing  armaments  in  the  world,  and  the  budgetary  provisions  that  have 
been  made  in  connection  therewith. 

In  close  relation  to  these  statistics  has  been,  I  think,  a  still  more 
important  collection  of  facts,  and  that  is  a  collection  of  the  statements 
of  the  various  Governments  as  to  their  requirements  for  armaments. 
You  will  remember  that,  by  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  8,  the  reduction 
of  national  armaments  is  to  be  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national 
safety.  Therefore,  in  any  enquiry  the  first  thing  which  you  have  to 
ascertain  is  what  are  the  armaments  required  by  the  national  safety  of 
each  State.  The  first  element  in  that  enquiry  is  naturally  what  the 
Government  of  each  State  thinks  to  be  necessary  for  the  safety  of  its 

14 


own  country.  We  have  received  a  very  large  number  of  replies.  They 
are  not  complete  yet,  and  we  recommend  strongly  that  they  should  be 
completed.  But  even  now  the  facts  collected  are  large  and  important. 
Some  of  the  countries — it  would  be  invidious  to  mention  names — have 
given  a  very  thorough  picture  of  what  they  conceive  to  be  their  necessi- 
ties, setting  out,  not  only  the  number  of  men,  and  so  on,  that  are  required, 
but  the  broad  reasons  for  which  they  are  required.  Other  States  have 
not  gone  quite  so  much  into  detail;  I  wish  they  all  had,  but  they  have 
given  us  very  important  information. 

The  result  is  a  formidable  total.  Hundred  of  millions  of  pounds 
are  stated  to  be  necessary.  Millions  of  men  are  required  to  be  with- 
drawn from  peaceful  and  remunerative  vacations  in  order  to  be  ready 
to  fight  the  battles  of  their  country.  Apart  from  all  other  considerations, 
as  has  been  often  and  continually  pointed  out  by  the  economic  advisers 
of  the  League,  the  strain  on  the  finances  of  the  world  by  this  state  of 
things  is  enormous. 

There  is  another  fact  which  comes  very  clearly  out  of  these  statistics. 
We  asked  the  Governments  of  the  countries  to  make  a  distinction  between 
what  they  required  for  external  purposes,  for  resisting  external  aggres- 
sion, and  what  they  required  for  internal  purposes,  for  maintaining  order, 
and  so  on,  in  their  countries.  The  result  is  very  striking  and  remarkable. 
The  amount  required  for  the  maintenance  of  internal  order,  on  the  state- 
ments of  the  Governments  themselves,  I  would  almost  say  is  negligible. 
It  is  quite  a  small  fraction  of  the  total  forces  required.  Broadly  speaking, 
I  think,  without  any  exception,  the  forces — these  millions  of  men  costing 
hundred  of  millions  of  pounds — are  required  only  for  the  purpose  of 
resisting  aggression.  What  does  that  mean  ?  It  means  that  we  are  paying 
this  vast  sum  every  year  for  no  remunerative  purpose  whatever,  for  no 
purpose  that  does  any  good  to  a  single  soul.  It  is  the  price  of  international 
suspicion,  and  nothing  else.  (Applause.) 

I  emphasize  that  because  that  note  has  to  struck  again  and  again  in 
any  enquiry  in  this  subject.  International  suspicion,  the  fear  of  each 
State  of  its  neighbor,  the  terror  that  it  is  going  to  be  attacked  by  those 
who  are  nominally  living  peacefully  with  it,  and  round  it — that  is  the 
great  obstacle  to  disarmament,  the  great  factor  in  armaments,  which  the 
League,  if  it  is  going  to  deal  with  this  question,  must  dispose  of. 

We  ask  the  Assembly  in  this  connection  to  urge  the  Members  of  the 
League  to  complete  as  soon  as  possible  the  information  which  they  have 
been  good  enough  to  give  us  so  far;  and  in  close  connection  with  that 
we  ask  the  Council  to  consider  once  again  (they  have  once  considered  it 
before)  whether  the  time  has  not  arrived  at  which  they  can  take  some 
steps  to  carry  out  the  last  paragraph  of  Article  8,  which  says:  "The 
Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  interchange  full  and  frank  informa- 
tion as  to  the  scale  of  their  armaments,  their  military,  naval,  and  air 

15 


programmes,  and  the  condition  of  such  of  their  industries  as  are  adaptable 
to  warlike  purposes."  The  statements  that  have  been  made  by  the 
Governments  are  a  first  step  in  that  direction,  but  we  hope  that  the 
Council  may  see  some  means  of  putting  that  interchange  on  a  permanent 
and  business  footing. 

One  other  subject  in  connection  with  the  preparatory  work  that 
has  been  done  I  must  mention.  If  you  are  to  reduce  armaments — and 
I  talk  for  the  moment  only  of  land  armaments,  because  it  does  not  apply 
to  naval  armaments,  nor  possibly  to  air  armaments  —  it  seems  almost 
essential  that  you  should  have  some  unit  by  which  they  are  measured. 
You  must  be  able  to  show  that  such-and-such  a  country  has  such-and-such 
a  strength,  and  other  countries  round  it  have  such-and-such  a  strength. 
If  you  are  to  induce  them  to  enter  upon  a  common  scheme  of  reduction, 
you  must  be  able  to  measure  the  requirements  or  the  suggestions  you  are 
going  to  make  by  some  unit,  and  a  great  deal  of  the  energy  of  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Commission  during  the  last  year  was  devoted  to  discovering 
some  satisfactory  unit  of  measurement  for  land  armament.  I  believe 
it  to  be  a  very  important  measure  if  it  can  be  achieved,  and,  indeed,  it 
does  not  seem  very  easy  to  see  how  you  can  formulate  a  scheme  for 
reduction  unless  you  have  such  a  unit. 

But  the  difficulties  in  arriving  at  a  unit  are  very  considerable.  I 
suppose  that  in  olden  times  the  strength  of  an  army  roughly  consisted 
of  the  number  of  men  that  you  could  put  into  the  line.  I  am  informed— 
I  do  not  pretend  to  be  an  expert  in  the  matter — that  that  would  be  a  very 
unsatisfactory  unit  by  which  to  measure  modern  armies,  and  that  the 
mechanical  part  of  modern  aggressive  equipment  is  so  important  that  it 
may  well  be  that  it  greatly  exceeds  in  importance  the  number  of  the 
individuals  who  compose  your  army.  That  evidently,  among  other 
things — and  there  are  many  other  complications — adds  greatly  to  the 
difficulty  of  arriving  at  the  unit.  We  have  not  yet  succeeded.  We  are 
still  investigating  the  matter.  Personally,  I  believe  that  such  a  unit 
can  be  arrived  at  if  we  are  content  to  have  one  which  will  be  of  broad, 
practical  value,  and  if  we  do  not  attempt  too  great  and  too  meticulous 
a  scientific  accuracy.  I  believe  that  it  must  be  found  in  a  combination 
of  the  expenditure  authorized  and  provided  for  the  armies  together 
with  the  number  of  the  personnel  employed.  Opinions  differ  as  to  which 
of  those  two  factors  will  be  the  more  important ;  but  out  of  a  combination 
of  those  two  the  unit  must  ultimately  be  discovered. 

On  that  part  of  the  subject  we  only  ask  the  Assembly  to  give  to  the 
Temporary  Mixed  Commission  the  authorization  to  pursue  its  enquiries, 
and  we  make  an  earnest  appeal,  repeated  more  than  once  in  this  report, 
to  the  Governments  of  the  Members  of  the  League  to  give  all  the  assis- 
tance they  can  to  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  in  their  arduous 
investigation. 

16 


I  now  come  to  the  actual  work  directly  designed  to  produce  a  reduction 
of  armaments.  It  is  evident  that  there  are  three  main  divisions  of  that 
subject — the  armaments  of  the  sea,  the  armaments  of  the  land,  and  the 
armaments  of  the  air.  Of  the  three,  the  problems  presented  by  sea 
armaments  are  undoubtedly  the  easiest.  A  navy  consists  for  the  most 
part  of  great  ships  which  are  obvious  to  all  the  world,  which  cannot  be 
concealed,  which  have  to  be  at  sea  if  they  are  to  be  kept  in  effective 
order;  and  to  a  very  large  extent,  as  I  understand  the  naval  opinion  of 
the  day,  the  strength,  of  a  navy  depends  upon  the  number  and  power  of 
what  are  called  its  capital  ships,  its  main  fighting  vessels.  These  ships, 
these  great  monsters,  are  not  only  quite  incapable  of  being  concealed, 
but  they  cannot  be  brought  into  existence  without  a  considerable  expendi- 
ture of  time.  If,  therefore,  you  can  limit  the  number  of  such  vessels, 
you  arrive  instantly,  immediately,  at  a  method  of  reduction  of  naval 
armaments  which  is  relatively  easy  to  put  into  effect  and  relatively  diffi- 
cult to  evade. 

It  is  rather  interesting  to  note  that  when  you  get  beyond  these  ships, 
when  you  get  to  the  smaller  vessels,  and  particularly  the  submarines, 
which  are  not  so  obvious  or  so  easily  controlled,  you  have  the  most  diffi- 
culty in  arriving  at  a  common  agreement  for  the  reduction  of  naval 
armaments. 

Now,  as  far  as  other  efforts  are  concerned,  we  have,  of  course,  the 
enormous  assistance  of  what  was  done  at  Washington.  You  will  find  in 
the  report  of  the  Third  Committee  an  acknowledgment  of  the  debt  that 
we  all  owe  to  the  work  which  was  done  there.  It  was  the  most  important 
step  towards  disarmament  that  has  ever  been  taken.  It  was  admirably 
accomplished.  Though  it  seems  ungracious  to  make  any  criticism,  the 
only  criticism  that  can  be  made  is  that  it  may  be,  perhaps,  that  the  want 
of  permanent  machinery  to  watch  over  and  complete  that  work  may 
render  its  accomplishment  not  in  all  respects  as  great  as  its  promise.  Still, 
an  enormous  step  forward  was  taken  at  Washington,  and  the  main  pur- 
pose of  our  proposal  is  to  extend  the  work  done  there  to  other  countries 
which  were  not  represented  at  the  Conference. 

You  will  find  in  our  resolutions  the  actual  proposal  we  make  in  this 
respect,  and,  as  this  is  one  of  the  most  important  parts  of  the  report,  I 
propose  to  read  the  resolution. 
The  first  one  was : — 

"(a)  That  an  International  Conference  should  be  summoned  by 
the  Council  as  soon  as  possible,  to  which  all  States,  whether  Members 
of  the  League  or  not,  should  be  invited,  with  a  view  to  considering 
the  extension  to  all  non-signatory  States  of  the  principles  of  the  Wash- 
ington Treaty  for  the  limitation  of  naval  armaments,  it  being  under- 
stood that  any  special  cases,  including  that  of  the  new  States,  shall 
be  given  due  consideration  at  the  Conference." 

17 


The  second  one  was: — 

"(b)  That  the  report  of  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission,  to- 
gether with  the  report  and  the  Draft  Convention  prepared  by  the 
Permanent  Advisory  Commission,  as  well  as  the  text  of  the  Wash- 
ington Treaty,  should  be  forwarded  immediately  to  the  various  Gov- 
ernments for  consideration." 

What  we  actually  did  was  this :  A  draft  Naval  Convention  designed 
to  carry  out  those  principles  was  presented  to  us.  Indeed,  to  be  accurate, 
three  draft  Naval  Conventions  were  presented  to  us,  one  by  the  English 
Representative,  one  by  the  French,  and  one  by  the  Italian.  They  were 
referred  to  the  Naval  Section  of  the  Permanent  Advisory  Commission,  the 
Commission  under  Article  9  of  the  Covenant.  That  Section  reported 
favorably  on  them  in  the  main,  and  drafted  a  Convention  of  their  own, 
largely  on  the  lines  of  the  Conventions  submitted  to  them.  That  was 
in  turn  submitted  to  the  Council  and  to  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commis- 
sion, and  forms  part  of  our  recommendation.  We  recommend  that 
this  Conference  should  be  called,  that  the  draft  Convention  should  be 
submitted  to  it  as  a  basis  for  discussion,  and  that  to  that  Conference  all 
States,  whether  Members  of  the  League  or  not,  should  be  summoned. 
You  will  observe  that  we  took  the  Washington  basis.  The  Washing- 
ton basis — I  speak  very  generally  and  roughly — was  the  status  quo  of 
naval  armaments,  together  with  a  provision  for  a  ten  years'  naval  holiday 
from  building.  We  took  that  basis  because  it  had  been  accepted  by  the 
most  powerful  of  the  naval  Powers,  and  because  it  provided  a  definite 
basis,  something  definite  on  which  we  could  proceed.  It  is  quite  evident, 
however,  that  it  cannot  be  applied  in  a  cast-iron  fashion.  Modifications 
will  have  to  be  made  in  particular  cases.  There  are  States,  I  am  glad 
to  say,  which  have  naval  armaments  so  small  that  for  the  purposes  of 
national  security  they  may  rightly  claim  an  increased  armament  rather 
than  a  decreased  armament.  There  is  also  the  case  of  the  new  States, 
which  have,  some  of  them,  no  naval  armaments  at  all.  All  these  cases 
will  have  to  be  considered  by  the  Conference,  and  no  doubt  whatever 
allowances  ought  to  be  made  will  be  made  by  that  body. 

The  Conference  is  to  be  summoned,  according  to  our  proposal,  by 
the  Council  of  the  League.  I  want  in  passing  to  note  this.  I  sometimes 
read  suggestions  that  international  conferences  are,  as  it  were,  an  alter- 
native to  League  procedure.  That  shows  how  difficult  it  is  to  get  men 
and  women  throughout  the  world  to  realize  the  facts  of  any  particular 
problem.  Anyone  who  has  studied  the  procedure  of  the  League  knows 
that  it  works  very  largely  through  the  summoning  of  special  conferences 
to  deal  with  special  technical  subjects.  We  have  had  a  Financial  Con- 
ference, a  Transit  Conference,  an  Epidemic  Conference,  and  many  others, 
and  it  is  right  that  it  should  be  so.  This  Assembly  is  in  itself  a  great 
world  Conference,  but  it  is  a  great  world  conference  consisting  for  the 

18 


most  part  of  men  who  are  skilled  in  statecraft,  statesmen  and  diplomats, 
and  it  is  quite  evident  that  it  does  not  contain  the  necessary  technical 
knowledge  to  deal  with  the  technical  problems  which  any  international 
organization  must  necessarily  have  to  deal  with.  It  is,  therefore,  a 
regular  part  of  our  procedure  to  summon  such  conferences  as  are  here 
recommended,  and  there  is  no  difficulty  and  no  obstacle  to  those  confer- 
ences including  nations  which  are  not  yet  Members  of  the  League. 

I  now  come  to  the  land  question,  and  that  is  undoubtedly  a  much 
more  difficult  one  even  than  that  of  the  sea,  because  you  have  the  difficulty 
as  to  units,  which  I  have  already  pointed  out,  and  you  have  this  additional 
difficulty  that  by  land  attack  sudden  incursions  can  be  made  from  one 
country  into  another,  and  it  is  not  enough  to  provide,  as  we  do  in  Article 
16,  for  the  eventual  punishment  of  the  aggressor,  of  the  sudden  and  un- 
provoked aggressor,  because  it  may  be  that  during  that  aggression  damage 
of  so  serious  a  character  may  be  inflicted  as  greatly  to  injure  the  attacked 
country,  whatever  may  be  done  at  a  later  time.  Danger  of  sudden  incur- 
sions is  really  the  reason  why  countries  insist  on  maintaining  these  large 
peace  forces,  which  I  have  already  alluded  to,  and  which  are  the  subject 
of  reduction  if  reduction  can  be  established.  That  is  an  essential  differ- 
ence between  the  land  and  the  sea,  and  unless  you  deal  with  this  difference 
you  cannot  hope  to  proceed  to  a  real  reduction  of  land  forces. 

Therefore,  the  Committee  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion,  and  present 
for  your  assent,  this  proposition,  that  if  you  are  to  persuade  the  great 
bulk  of  nations,  and  particularly  European  nations,  to  make  a  serious 
reduction  of  their  armed  forces,  you  must  provide  for  them  some  alterna- 
tive security.  You  will  find  the  actual  proposal  set  out  in  the  resolutions 
in  our  report.  Since  I  have  already  consumed  your  time  very  largely 
I  will  not  read  those  resolutions  to  you  now.  You  will  find  that  their 
principle  is  this:  that  if  you  are  to  have  an  effective,  a  fully  effective 
reduction  of  armed  forces,  it  must  be  general.  That  is  obvious.  You 
cannot  have  a  partial  reduction,  because  it  would  leave  the  countries 
which  reduced  their  forces  at  the  mercy  of  those  who  did  not  reduce 
their  forces.  It  must  be  general. 

You  cannot  expect  many  of  the  countries  to  reduce  unless  you,  give 
them  some  alternative  security,  and  it  is  suggested  that  that  alternative 
security  is  to  be  found  in  what  is  called  a  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee, 
that  is,  a  treaty  which  will  give  effective,  real,  well-thought-out  assistance 
to  any  country  that  is  suddenly  attacked.  But  that  guarantee,  if  it  is  to 
be  effective  for  disarmament,  must  be  dependent  on  disarmament  being 
carried  out.  And  what  I  would  say  to  this  Assembly  is  that,  though  I 
believe  that  on  those  lines,  and  those  lines  only  as  far  as  I  can  see,  a 
scheme  of  disarmament  is  to  be  found,  there  are  certain  dangers  which 
must  be  guarded  against  and  guarded  against  carefully.  You  must  not 
allow  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee,  which  is  designed  for  disarma- 

19 


ment,  to  change  its  nature  and  become  merely  one  of  the  old  type  of 
defensive  alliances.  (Applause.) 

It  will  be  absolutely  fatal  to  the  cause  of  disarmament  itself  if  you 
once  see  re-established  in  Europe  and  the  world  the  old  system  of  groups 
of  nations,  allied  amongst  themselves  no  doubt,  but  allied  against  other 
nations,  which  will  also  form  groups.  If  you  once  get  that  system  of 
rival  groups  of  nations  in  Europe  all  hope  of  disarmament  is  gone,  all 
hope  of  progress  is  destroyed,  and  we  are  once  again  in  the  terrible 
condition  in  which  we  found  ourselves  at  the  eve  of  the  Great  War. 
(Applause.) 

Therefore  in  our  proposal  we  lay  emphasis  on  two  safeguards.  The 
first  is  that  this  alliance,  this  new  guarantee,  must  be  open  to  all  nations 
without  exception.  (Applause.)  We  hope,  some  of  us  more  sanguinely 
than  others,  that  once  you  get  that  guarantee  set  up,  once  you  get  it  begun 
and  once  you  get  it  before  the  peoples  of  the  world,  the  nations  will 
hasten  to  join  it.  It  will  be  the  great  hope  for  the  peoples  of  the  world, 
the  only  hope  they  have  of  getting  rid  of  this  burden  of  armaments  and 
this  menace  of  war.  But  whether  few  or  more  nations  can  be  induced 
to  join  it  at  the  outset,  it  must  be  open  to  all  nations — that  is  an  essential 
feature  of  the  scheme. 

The  second  feature  is  this,  that  guarantee  and  reduction  of  arma- 
ments must  go  hand  in  hand.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  you  will  not, 
in  some  cases,  be  able  to  obtain  reduction  of  armaments  without  a 
guarantee ;  so  much  the  better  where  that  can  be  done.  There  are  cases, 
which  we  were  told  of  in  the  Committee,  of  the  Scandinavian  countries 
which  desire  to  reserve  liberty  of  action,  on  the  theory  that  they  may  be 
able  to  carry  out  very  extensive  reductions  of  their  armaments  without 
any  guarantee.  It  is  evident  that  geographical  position  may  enable  cer- 
tain groups  of  countries)  to  do  that,  and  in  that  connection  perhaps  I  may 
be  allowed  to  mention,  as  it  is  mentioned  in  the  report,  the  Congress  of 
the  South  American  States  which  is  to  be  held  at  Santiago  next  March. 
It  may  be  that  they  can  arrive  at  some  system  of  wholesale  reduction  of 
armaments,  not  dependent  upon  guarantee.  But,  speaking  generally,  you 
will  not  be  able  to  get  a  general  reduction  of  armaments  without  some 
alternative  security  such  as  a  guarantee.  Therefore  you  cannot  hope  for 
your  general  reduction  without  guarantee.  But  it  is  equally  true  that 
you  cannot  ask  for  a  guarantee  without  reduction;  for  some  nations  to 
undertake  such  a  guarantee  as  this  would  be  a  very  heavy  responsibility. 

There  may  be  some  nations  who  will  hesitate  to  undertake  it.  I 
hope  that  they  will  get  over  their  hesitation.  I  want  to  see  this  a  uni- 
versal movement  in  which  all  nations  will  take  a  part,  because  in  the  last 
analysis  it  is  to  the  interest  of  all  nations  that  there  should  be  general 
disarmament  and  consequently  general  peace.  But  it  will  be  a  heavy 
demand  to  make  upon  some  nations.  It  will  be  exposed  to  very  simple, 

20 


facile,  popular  misrepresentation,  and  the  only  thing  which  you  could 
say  to  nations  of  that  kind  is  this :  "You  have  got  to  pay  some  price  for 
general  disarmament;  if  you  want  peace  you  must  have  disarmament, 
and  if  you  want  disarmament  you  must  be  ready  to  pay  a  price  in  order 
to  obtain  it.  You  can  get  nothing  for  nothing  in  this  world,  and  if 
you  desire  disarmament  you  must  be  prepared  to  give  a  guarantee." 
(Applause.) 

Of  course,  .the  broad  principle  of  a  guarantee  is  merely  a  cut  at  the 
roots  of  that  international  suspicion  of  which  I  have  spoken,  and  unless 
you  can  destroy  that  no  effective  advance  can  be  made  towards  disarma- 
ment; and  though  I  believe  that  the  general  guarantee  is  an  essential 
feature  in  any  attack  on  that  international  suspicion,  an  essential  feature 
in  the  process  which  has  been  eloquently  called  from  this  tribune,  moral 
disarmament,  I  do  not  believe  that  it  is  the  only  step  which  must  be  taken 
if  you  are  to  achieve  that  result.  (Applause.) 

I  will  not  dwell  on  it  at  length  to-day,  but  at  the  end  of  our  report 
you  will  find  that  we  emphasize  one  aspect  of  that  case  as  strongly  as 
we  can.  In  the  Third  Committee  we  have  been  much  impressed,  as 
every  other  person  who  has  given  any  attention  to  the  subject  must  be 
impressed,  with  the  terrible  condition  of  Unrest  and  disquiet  prevailing 
in  the  world,  and  particularly  in  Europe,  as  a  consequence  of  the  eco- 
nomic difficulties  which  unhappily  exist.  The  collapse  of  the  exchanges, 
the  prevalence  of  unemployment,  the  hindrance  to  international  trade, 
are  symptoms  of  a  profound  unrest  and  disquiet  which  must  react  upon 
the  political  and  military  situation  and  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of 
that  international  suspicion  which  is  the  very  root  of  all  evil  in  this 
matter;  and  we  have  ventured  to  press  upon  this  Assembly,  and  if  we 
may  do  so  upon  the  world,  the  vital  importance  of  coping  with  this  eco- 
nomic difficulty.  We  have  not  concealed  from  ourselves  that  one  of  the 
main  causes  of  it  is  the  question  of  inter-Governmental  indebtedness,  the 
question  of  reparations  and  Allied  debts  of  which  so  much  is  heard,  and 
to  solve  which  so  many  attempts  have  been  made.  We  venture  to  urge 
on  those  immediately  interested  the  importance  of  a  solution  to  these 
questions.  We  venture  to  appeal  to  all  the  nations  to  lend  their  moral 
support,  and,  if  necessary,  other  support  also,  to  their  solution,  and 
though  it  is  not  our  business  to  point  out  the  steps  which  should  be 
taken,  I  venture  to  say  that  this  question  can  only  be  solved  if  it  is 
approached  in  an  international  spirit,  if  creditor  and  debtor,  victor  and 
vanquished  are  alike  ready  to  make  sacrifices.  (Applause.)  It  is  only 
in  a  spirit  of  that  kind  that  a  solution  of  this  question  will  be  reached. 
(Applause.) 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  those  are  the  steps  towards  moral  disarma- 
ment which  we  urge  this  Assembly  to  endorse.  But  we  do  not  ask  you 
to  wait  there  until  that  has  been  carried  out  before  anything  is  done; 

21 


on  the  contrary,  the  two  causes  must  proceed,  pari  passu — moral  disarma- 
ment and  material  disarmament  must  go  together.  You  will  be  able  to 
achieve  material  disarmament,  the  more  you  get  moral  disarmament ;  the 
more  you  get  material  disarmament,  the  more  you  will  achieve  moral 
disarmament. 

And  there  are  some  things  which  can  be  immediately  done.  There 
is  the  question  of  the  private  manufacture  of  arms  and  the  arms  traffic 
to  which  I  have  referred.  We  urge  upon  you  this.  We  had  under  our 
consideration  a  draft  scheme  for  the  control  of  the  private  manufacture 
of  armaments,  and  we  urge  that  that  should  be  considered  by  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Committee,  and  that  a  definite  scheme  should  be  elaborated 
upon  it.  As  for  the  arms  traffic,  that  is,  indeed,  a  melancholy  story.  I 
do  not  believe  it  is  possible  to  exaggerate — at  any  rate,  it  is  very  difficult 
to  exaggerate — the  importance  of  that  question.  I  believe  that  if,  three 
years  ago,  we  had  had  a  proper  control  of  the  traffic  in  arms  very  many 
of  the  disturbances  and  hostilities,  much  of  the  fighting  that  has  since 
taken  place,  would  never  have  occurred.  (Applause.) 

It  is  really  a  melancholy  picture  that  one  gets  of  certain  aspects  of 
human  nature,  when  you  consider  what  is  actually  going  on  in  this  matter. 
The  other  day  I  read  this  statement  in  a  newspaper — I  do  not  vouch  for 
its  truth,  but  it  is,  at  any  rate,  an  illustration  of  what  might  easily  happen, 
even  if  it  has  not  already  occurred: — 

"According  to  trustworthy  information  received  from  quarters  that 

are  informed  of  Bolshevik  activities  in  various  countries,  it  appears  that 

agents  of  the  Moscow  authorities  are  buying  considerable  quantities 

of  arms.    A  very  large  order  for  armored  cars,  lorries,  motor-cars,  and, 

it  appears  also,  for  machine-guns,  is  understood  to  have  been  placed 

with  .  .  ." — a  particular  works,  which  is  there  named. 

What  a  melancholy  thing  that  we,  the  countries  in  the  West  should 

actually  be  engaged  in  arming  a  Government,  one  of  whose  main  tenets 

it  is  that  it  is  the  enemy  of  all  the  existing  Governments  of  the  world. 

Yet  that  can  go  on  at  present,  and  does  go  on,  as  every  one  knows.     It 

is  called  "business  enterprise,"  I  believe;  I  should  be  inclined  to  give  it 

a  rather  harsher  name.     (Applause.) 

From  the  very  outset  of  the  League  this  question  has  been  taken  up. 
At  Paris  in  1919  a  Convention  was  framed  to  deal  with  this  question.  It 
was  accepted  by  those  who  were  there,  subject,  of  course,  to  ratification. 
Since  then  at  every  meeting  of  the  Assembly  strong  resolutions  have  been 
passed,  urging  its  acceptance  by  all  the  nations  of  the  world,  and  after 
three  years'  continuous  effort  we  have  arrived  at  this  position,  that  prac- 
tically all  the  important  nations  of  the  world  have  accepted  it,  and  have 
agreed  to  ratify  it  and  to  promote  the  necessary  legislation  to  make  it 
effective  in  their  countries  on  one  condition,  that  it  was  universally 
accepted. 

22 


The  one  exception  was  the  United  States  of  America,  and  we  hoped 
to  receive  their  assent  to  this  Convention.  It  is  not  for  us  to  criticize  them, 
but  we  received  on  July  28th  last  a  definite  statement  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  was  not  in  a  position  to  ratify  this  Conven- 
tion, and  I  am  afraid,  therefore,  that  effort  to  control  the  traffic  in  arms 
must  now  be  definitely  ruled  out  as  a  possibility. 

There  is  one  favorable  aspect  of  the  matter  which  I  must  not  forget. 
In  the  note  which  has  been  sent  us  is  contained,  as  you  will  see  in  our 
report,  the  statement  that  "The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  in 
cordial  sympathy  with  efforts  to  restrict  traffic  in  arms  and  munitions  of 
war,  .  .  ."  and  that  "It  is  desirous  to  co-operate  for  the  purpose  of 
suitably  controlling  the  traffic."  That  is  a  very  important  declaration, 
and  we  venture  to  hope  that  we  may  be  informed  of  the  conditions  on 
which  the  United  States  will  join  in  this  effort. 
Our  resolution  is  to  this  effect: — 

"That  it  is  highly  desirable  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  should  express  the  objections  which  it  has  to  formulate  against 
the  provisions  of  the  Convention  of  St.  Germain,  and  any  proposals  it 
may  care  to  make  as  to  the  way  in  which  these  objections  can  be 
overcome." 

Then  we  go  on  to  ask  that  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  should 
be  instructed  to  continue  its  labors  in  framing  a  plan  for  controlling  the 
traffic  in  arms  and  preparing  a  suitable  Convention  as  soon  as  it  can. 
I  do  earnestly  hope  that  this  object  may  be  achieved,  because  I  am 
satisfied  that  of  the  minor  steps  that  can  be  taken  none  would  be  more 
valuable  than  an  effective  Convention  for  the  control  of  the  traffic  in 
arms. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  pass  from  that  to  the  final  division  of  my 
subject,  namely,  the  question  of  control  of  the  air  forces  of  the  world. 
No  doubt  the  control  of  the  traffic  in  arms  will  do  something  for  that 
purpose,  but  not  much.  No  doubt  the  air  problem  is  the  most  difficult 
of  all  the  three,  and  the  question  of  attack  from  the  air  will  be  one  of 
the  subtlest  problems  in  the  future. 

The  developments  of  air  attacks  are  the  most  obscure  that  we  have 
to  deal  with.  Immense  progress  is  constantly  being  made  in  the  art  of 
aviation  and  air  attack,  and  owing  to  the  relatively  small  size  of  the  units 
concerned,  it  is  very  difficult  to  devise  any  system  of  effective  control, 
and  the  difficulty  is  greatly  complicated  by  the  fact,  I  am  told,  that 
commercial  airships  or  aeroplanes  can  be  used  for  military  purposes  with 
very  slight,  if  any,  alteration.  It  is  true  we  may  be  able  to  do  some- 
thing, and  one  of  the  things  we  have  been  able  to  do  is  to  investigate 
by  means  of  budgetary  control,  and  by  control  of  the  number  of  persons 
trained  and  capable  of  manning  the  air  fleets  of  the  world.  Perhaps, 
also  (this  is  another  interesting  line  of  enquiry  which  we  must  pursue), 

23 


something  may  be  done  by  making  air  forces  the  special  weapons  which 
the  League  will  have  a  right  to  call  upon  in  order  to  carry  out  its  duties 
under  the  Covenant,  and  more  particularly  which  the  guarantor  Powers 
will  have  a  right  to  call  upon  in  execution  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  of  Guarantees.  But  I  fully  admit  that  that  part  of  our  problem 
is  the  most  difficult,  and  I  am  quite  certain  it  is  the  most  urgent. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  since  the  war  enormous  advances  have  been 
made  in  this  department  of  military  knowledge.  The  machines,  so  I 
am  informed,  are  in  all  respects  better,  the  engines  are  more  trustworthy, 
the  lifting  power  is  greater,  the  size  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  bombs 
have  been  enormously  increased.  I  was  told  the  other  day  that  it  would 
not  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  bombs  possess  at  least  ten  times  the 
power  they  had  at  the  close  of  the  war,  and,  in  addition,  you  have  the 
awful  and  appalling  possibility  of  poison  gas  and  germ  warfare. 

I  know  Conventions  were  made  at  Washington  by  which  we  recom- 
mended all  the  nations  of  the  world  to  prohibit  the  use  of  poison  gas, 
and  still  more  the  dissemination  of  germs,  but  I  confess  I  feel  that  to 
be  a  very  slender  protection  against  these  terrible  possibilities  when  you 
reflect  on  what  actually  happened  in  the  late  war.  If  you  are  going  to 
deal  fairly  and  honestly  with  the  matter  you  have  got  to  face,  at  any 
rate,  the  possibility  (I  am  afraid  I  should  put  it  higher)  that  in  a  world- 
struggle,  a  struggle  for  life  and  death  between  the  nations  of  the  world, 
it  will  be  impossible  to  limit  the  use  of  any  weapon  which  may  be  effec- 
tive, or  which  may  be  thought  to  be  effective,  ini  order  to  produce  victory. 

What  does  this  mean?  I  am  told  at  the  present  moment,  leaving 
out  the  question  of  poison  gas  altogether,  that  the  means  of  attack  are 
so  terrific  that  the  greatest  cities  of  the  world  might  in  a  short  time  be 
rendered  uninhabitable,  and  that  the  only  way  of  replying  to  such  an 
attack  would  be  by  a  counter-attack  on>  the  cities  of  the  aggressive  nation. 
What  an  awful  picture  of  the  result  of  human  progress !  What  an  awful 
possibility  to  contemplate,  that  unless  the  opinions  we  entertain  here  are 
realized,  the  only  way  of  settling  our  disputes  is  by  levelling  to  the 
ground  the  cities  of  the  world  and  destroying  the  fruits  of  years  and 
generations  of  human  effort! 

And,  remember,  that  this  is  leaving  out  all  the  possible  developments 
of  poison  gas,  the  horrible  possibilities,  which  are  by  no  means  remote, 
of  an  extension  of  that  particularly  terrible  form  of  warfare. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  do  not  know  of  any  means  by  which,  if 
war  continues,  these  things  can  be  limited,  and  your  Committee  has  only 
made  one  suggestion  on  the  point.  They  think  the  peoples  of  the  world 
ought  to  know  what  they  are  facing  in  another  war,  and  the  Committee 
ask  you  to  consent  to  the  appointment  of  a  small  Committee,  whose  duty 
will  not  be  to  pry  into  unknown  secrets,  but  merely  to  bring  together  in 
an  authoritative  form  the  known  facts,  so  that  the  people  of  the  world 

24 


may  know  the  abyss  to  which  the  world  is  being  hurried  at  the  present 
moment.  (Applause.) 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  you  will  be  glad  to  hear  that  I  have  nearly 
finished  my  review  of  this  report,  and  I  apologize  for  having  detained 
you  so  long.  We  ask  that  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  may  be 
re-appointed  to  continue  its  labors,  and  we  hope  it  may  receive  in  the 
carrying  out  of  those  labors  the  full  assistance  and  support  of  all  the 
Governments  represented  in  this  room,  for  the  duties  it  has  to  perform 
are  great  and  important,  and  their  difficulties  are  enormous.  It  is  no 
subordinate  issue  we  are  laying  before  you  to-day. 

We  are  convinced,  and  I  believe  that  you  are  convinced,  that  so 
long  as  offensive  armaments  exist  sooner  or  later  they  will  be  used. 
My  study  of  the  subject,  and,  I  believe  everyone's  study,  leads  to  this 
inevitable  conclusion — that  if,  once  again,  we  have  to  face  a  world- war, 
civilization  itself  will  be  destroyed.  It  is  no  exaggeration,  but  it  is  literally 
true,  that  the  nations  of  the  world  must  disarm  or  perish.  The  choice  is 
before  them.  Let  them  choose  life  or  death.  We  cannot  compel  them 
to  choose,  but  we  do  think  that  the  peoples  of  the  world  should  be  given 
a  fair  opportunity  of  choosing.  We  ask  that  you  should  help  us,  or 
that  we  should  help  you  rather,  to  lay  before  the  peoples  of  the  world  an 
alternative,  a  way  of  safety,  a  definite  practical  scheme  of  disarmament. 
Then  let  them  choose.  If  they  really  are  anxious  to  have  peace  let 
them  take  the  way  to  peace,  and,  if  not,  let  them  take  the  way  to 
destruction,  and  their  blood  be  upon  their  own  heads.  (Loud  and  pro- 
longed applause.) 

IV. — Speech  of  M.  de  Jouvenel  in  the  Assembly 

After  Lord  Robert's  speech,  M.  Scialoja  (Italy)  addressed  the, 
Assembly,  and  then  M.  de  Jouvenel  spoke  for  France.  A  part  of  his 
address  follows.  It  is  of  special  importance,  because  the  needs  and  fears 
of  France  are  the  central  fact  in  the  problem  of  disarmament.  This 
was  as  clearly  revealed  at  the  Washington  Conference  as  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference: 

The  great  change  which  has  been  effected  during  the  past  century 
in  the  relations  between  man  and  the  universe  makes  it  impossible  to 
doubt  that  we  shall  one  day  see  a  similar  change  in  the  relations  between 
man  and  man,  for  it  cannot  be  that  mankind  can  be  the  only  power  in 
nature  which  the  human  brain  fails  to  dominate.  (Loud  applause.) 

Fortunately,  Lord  Robert  Cecil  is  an  idealist,  and  I  respectfully 
admire  him  for  it.  I  know  that  perfection  cannot  be  attained  by  men, 
or  even  by  politicians,  who  are  accused  of  every  crime.  This  has  been  so 
since  the  beginning  of  history,  as  I  think  that  the  oldest  known  manu- 
script, the  Theban  Papyrus,  which  we  preserve  in  the  Bibliotheque  Na- 

25 


tionale,  contains  this  precept :  "Do  not  mix  with  the  crowd  for  fear  that 
your  name  should  be  smirched." 

But  I  know,  too,  that  the  accusation  which  redounds  most  greatly 
tq  the  credit  of  a  politician  is  perhaps  that  of  being  a  Utopian,  for  in 
reality  Utopia  is  often  only  a  name  given  to  the  future  by  the  past. 
(Applause.) 

The  primary  condition  of  establishing  peace  in  the  world  is  to  believe 
in  it. 

But  there  is  another  condition,  and  that  is  to  study  the  sequence 
by  which  an  idea  can  pass  from  the  imagination  of  men  into  the  realm 
of  fact,  and  to  satisfy  and  abide  by  the  conditions  which  old  civilizations, 
with  their  administrations,  their  habits  of  thought,  and  their  routine, 
impose  upon  human  aspiration. 

Lord  Robert  Cecil  has  attempted  to  satisfy  these  conditions,  and  I 
think  he  has  very  largely  succeeded  in  doing  so,  by  the  Treaty  of  Guar- 
antee. We  cannot  forget  that  there  have  been  long  periods  when  within 
every  country  and  within  every  tribe  man's  whole  security  rested  in  his 
strength  and  weapons,  when  he  was  his  own  law,  his  own  police,  his 
own  justice,  and  that  it  has  taken  us  long  enough  to  realize  how  singular 
was  this  system  of  political  and  social  security,  whereby  a  man  only  felt 
safe  in  so  far  as  he  was  a  danger  to  his  fellows. 

Nevertheless,  men  realized  it  at  last,  and  gradually  began  to  create 
a  form  of  justice  to  which  men  of  goodwill  had  recourse;  then,  much 
later,  they  organized  a  police  force;  then,  later- again,  they  reached  the 
point  of  organizing  that  system  of  insurance  companies  whereby  the 
man  whose  house  is  burnt  down  can  regain  the  money  required  for  its 
reconstruction,  and  whereby  the  poor  widow  and  her  children  may  be 
certain  of  the  bread  which  the  dead  worker  will  give  them  no  more. 

Now,  when  nations  followed  the  example  of  individuals  by  forming 
societies,  their  intention  was  to  pass  through  the  same  phases  as  the 
individual,  and,  ultimately,  to  guarantee  to  the  peoples  as  a  whole  ever 
larger  forms  of  security  similar  to  those  which  every  country  offers  to 
each  and  all  the  individuals  which  comprise  it. 

You  have  begun,  gentlemen,  by  creating  a  tribunal — the  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice — which  can,  at  present,  define  justice,  but 
cannot  dispense  it.  For  its  sentences  are  not  obligatory.  The  words 
which  it  speaks  from  above  the  conflicts  are  often  drowned  by  the  clash 
of  armed  peoples.  The  international  law  of  which  we  hail  the  birth  is 
the  only  form  of  law  which  as  yet  includes  no  sanctions.  (Applause.) 

By  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee  Lord  Robert  Cecil  has  begun 
the  organization  of  such  sanctions ;  in  doing  so  he  has  fulfilled  one  of  the 
most  cherished  projects  of  my  country's  Representatives — the  project 
which,  in  the  early  days  of  the  League  of  Nations,  M.  Leon  Bourgeois 
defined,  with  all  the  clearness  of  his  lucid  intellect,  and  which  has  been 

26 


spread  afar  and  wide  by  the  great  voice  of  M.  Viviani.  Lord  Robert 
Cecil  has  sought  to  organize  that  international  power  which  must  form 
the  foundation  of  international  law.  The  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee, 
which  he  proposed  during  the  discussion  on  this  subject,  was  envisaged 
by  the  Third  Committee  under  three  somewhat  different  aspects. 

First,  there  was  Lord  Robert  Cecil's  conception ;  he  desires  a  general 
treaty,  or,  rather,  he  desires  to  begin  with  a  general  treaty,  which  would 
bind  all  the  countries  of  the  world  at  the  same  moment,  would  cause  them 
all  to  disarm  in  the  same  proportion,  and  would  give  to  all  a  guarantee 
without  risks. 

Then  there  was  the  Scandinavian  conception.  Its  purport  is  that 
disarmament  must  be  general,  but  that  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee 
need  not  be  so;  that  the  countries  could  swear  to  observe  peace  without 
undertaking  to  make  others  observe  it. 

Lastly,  there  was  the  Latin  conception,  which  was  supported  by  the 
Representatives  of  Italy,  Brazil,  Roumania,  Poland,  and  other  countries, 
and  was  maintained  by  the  French  Representative  with  an  obstinacy  for 
which  he  asks  your  indulgence. 

When  I  recall  the  recent  invasion  of  Belgium,  and  the  still  more 
recent  invasion  of  Poland,  when  I  realize  that  at  this  moment  there 
are  in  Europe  two  great  Powers  whose  alliance  is  the  chief  danger  to 
the  peace  of  Europe :  the  one  a  country  of  mystery  more  closely  sealed 
to-day  than  in  the  beginnings  of  civilization,  closed  against  all  com- 
missions of  control,  and  able  to  press  forward  the  preparations  for  the 
next  war,  while  the  other  can  furnish  the  organization  required  by  the 
first;  and  being  convinced  that  humanity  must  first  reinforce  the  most 
seriously  threatened  points,  I,  for  my  part,  believe  that  individual  treaties 
must  precede  the  general  Treaty.  The  whole  cause  of  disarmament  and 
peace  must  not  be  delayed  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  general  treaty,  for  in 
that  case  it  would  be  made  to  hang  upon  the  refusal  of  a  single  nation ; 
on  the  contrary,  I  think  the  great  Western  nations  should  conclude 
individual  treaties  among  themselves. 

By  such  individual  treaties  these  great  nations  would  assume  obliga- 
tions not  only  towards  one  another,  but  also,  and  above  all,  towards  the 
small  and  weak  nations;  they  would  give  their  guarantee  to  the  most 
threatened  frontiers.  They  would  thus  make  possible  a  reduction  of 
armaments  by  the  nations  which  most  need  them,  and  have  the  greatest 
inducements  to  arm ;  weak  and  trustful  nations  would  thus  no  longer  be 
left  at  the  mercy  of  imperialistic,  powerful,  and  enterprising  Governments. 
(Applause.) 

The  Temporary  Mixed  Commission  and  the  Permanent  Advisory 
Committee  will  examine  these  three  conceptions.  We  do  not  exclude 
any  of  them,  though  we  consider  Lord  Robert  Cecil's  the  most  desirable. 

In  any  event,  and  in  whatever  form  these  treaties  may  later  be  con- 

27 


eluded,  there  is  no  doubt  that  they  must  not  be  like  the  pre-war  alliances, 
and  that  they  must  remain  perpetually  open  to  all  nations  of  good  faith, 
provided  that  their  good  faith  be  proved.  (Applause.) 

But  it  is  not  enough  to  set  up  a  tribunal,  it  is  not  enough  to  organize 
a  police  force;  we  must  follow  out  the  general  idea  of  the  insurance 
company. 

We  must  admit  that  the  victory  of  civilization  is  perhaps  not  yet 
complete.  One  hundred  and  thirty  years  ago,  in  the  early  days  of  the 
French  Revolution,  a  revolutionary  speaker  summed  up  all  the  hopes 
which  the  revolution  aroused  in  Europe,  and  all  the  difficulties  with 
which  it  met,  in  a  striking  phrase :  "Remember  that  happiness  is  a  new 
idea  in  Europe." 

This  idea  has  been  abandoned,  it  has  been  betrayed;  but  I  know 
of  one  nation  which  has  never  renounced  it,  and  which  would  think 
that  it  is  useless  to  have  shed  so  much  blood  at  all  the  stations  of  all  the 
Calvaries  unless  at  the  end  there  is  a  little  light  on  the  hill-tops. 

Set  against  this  conception  of  civilization  there  is  another,  expressed 
in  Bismarck's  phrase:  "Might  is  right";  and  in  Bethmann-Hollweg's : 
"Treaties  are  scraps  of  paper" — the  conception  which  with  Nietzsche, 
the  most  famous  philosopher  of  modern  Germany,  regards  truth  as  the 
most  ineffective  form  of  knowledge. 

Of  these  two  civilizations  one  must  be  right.  Victory  does  not 
consist  in  scattered  fleets,  in  destroyed  armies  and  reconquered  lands: 
victory  is  the  bringing  of  men's  minds  to  the  victor's  conception  of  human 
civilization.  (Applause.) 

What,  then,  is  the  idea  which  must  be  rooted  out  of  men's  minds? 
It  is  the  idea  by  virtue  of  which  political,  financial,  and  economic  methods 
culminate  in  invasion. 

We  have  not  only  to  secure  ourselves  against  the  invasion  of  to- 
morrow; we  have  to  efface  the  marks  of  the  invasion  of  yesterday. 
Reparations  must  follow  the  footsteps  left  by  invasion. 

If  we  wish  to  avoid  the  war  of  to-morrow  we  must  blot  out  the 
last  traces  of  the  war  of  yesterday.  That  is  why  the  French  Representa- 
tive made  that  first  proposal  to  rid  Europe  of  the  increase  of  armaments, 
which  is  the  legacy  of  the  great  war;  to  begin  by  reducing  the  total 
military,  naval  and  air  expenditure  of  every  nation  to  the  1913  figure, 
calculated  by  the  methods  of  the  Temporary  Mixed  Commission;  and 
he  suggested,  in  the  second  place,  the  method  which  consists  in  joining 
together  the  problem  of  reparations  and  the  problem  of  inter-Allied 
debts,  in  order  to  arrive,  as  soon  as  possible,  at  a  solution  of  the  whole 
economic  and  financial  question  which  weighs  down  Europe,  and,  after 
giving  the  nations  relief  from  the  burden  of  armaments,  to  free  their 
minds  from  anxiety  with  regard  to  their  economic  and  financial  future. 

28 


The  Committee  adopted  both  these  proposals  and  submits  them  to  the 
Assembly. 

In  this  way  we  hope  that  we  have  served  well  the  cause  of  peace 
to  which  no  country  is  more  attached  than  my  own. 

The  more  strongly  my  country  has  built  up  its  national  unity,  the 
higher  it  has  raised  it,  the  wider  the  prospects  of  humanity  it  has  per- 
ceived, and  the  more  it  has  understood  that  its  real  destiny,  inherent  in 
its  nature  and  history,  is  to  carry  from  continent  to  continent,  from  sea 
to  sea,  the  benefits  of  civilizations  ignorant  of  one  another,  and  thus 
to  increase  the  thought  of  each  people  by  the  thought  of  all  the  others, 
in  the  hope  of  compounding  one  day  out  of  the  spirit  of  every  age  and 
the  light  of  every  clime  the  atmosphere  which  the  modern  man  requires 
to  draw  the  breath  of  life.  (Applause.) 

Last  year,  at  the  Assembly,  my  friend  and  colleague,  M.  Noblemaire, 
who  is  kept  from  us  by  illness,  told  you  how  fierce  was  France's  hatred 
of  war.  His  words  found  an,  echo  in  your  hearts.  I  ask  you,  gentlemen, 
to  keep  them  in  your  memory,  and  remember  that,  even  if  all  the  other 
nations  forget  the  war,  there  is  one  that  could  not  forget  it,  for  she  is 
the  guardian  of  your  graves,  Great  Britain,  of  yours,  Dominions,  of 
yours,  Italy,  of  yours,  Belgium,  and  of  yours,  Portugal,  and  of  the  graves 
of  all  the  volunteers  who  came  from  most  of  the  countries  represented 
in  this  Assembly. 

During  the  war  we  acted  as  the  advance  guard  of  civilization,  but 
we  know  that  our  victory  was  only  possible  because  we  were  on  the  side 
of  Right,  because  one  by  one  the  civilized  nations  took  their  places  at  our 
side,  and  at  last,  one  day,  we  heard  the  cry,  sublime  in  its  heroism  and 
its  gratitude:  "Lafayette,  we  are  here!" 

Conscious  of  having  constituted  the  first  international  force  enlisted 
in  the  service  of  peace,  mounting  guard  round  the  treaties,  we  await 
relief,  and  declare  that  the  cause  of  peace  will  be  definitely  won  in  our 
eyes  on  the  day  when  mankind,  by  bringing  us  the  Treaty  of  Mutual 
Guarantee,  will  say  to  us  in  its  turn:  "France,  we  are  here!"  (Loud 
and  prolonged  applause.) 


29 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 
LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


'5 


J  L.O 


IN  STACKS 


SEP  2  8 1957 


* 


.  ;.     - 


^ 


151963 


/IPfi  .7  7  fQfi 

3 

".,'>  \ 

ncp  c      IQCC  Q  ( 

3 
1 

LD  21A-50TO-8/57 
(C8481slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


Photomount 

Pamphlet 

Binder 

Gaylord  Bros.,  Inc. 

Makers 

Stockton,  Ca!if . 
PAT.  JAN.  21.  1908 


784943 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


